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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

DOUG CRUMP and AMY CRUMP, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
V.

TED BROMLEY dba RHINO LINING,
Defendant/Respondent.
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Supreme Court Docket No. 35666

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District for Bonneville County.
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge, presiding.
B. J. Driscoll, Esq., residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho, for Appellants.
Justin B. Oleson, Esq., residing at Blackfoot, Idaho, for Respondent.
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ARGUMENT

I.
THE CRUMPS SUCCESSFULLY AVOIDED ALL LIABILITY TO BROMLEY AND
BROMLEY DID NOT "RECOVER" ON HIS COUNTERCLAIM.
Bromley engages in a purely semantic argument that the Crumps "obvious[ly] and
intentional[ly]" misstate the facts of this case by stating that they "successfully avoided all
liability. " 1 Without any basis in the record, Bromley further argues that he "recovered" the
entire amount he sought in his counterclaim. 2 Neither argument is accurate. The undisputed
record shows that the court entered judgment for the Crumps and entered no judgment for
Bromley. The fact that the parties stipulated to this result does not change the legal effect of the
result. As a matter of law, the Crumps recovered on their claim against Bromley and in fact
avoided any liability to Bromley on his counterclaim. The court entered no judgment in favor of
Bromley on his counterclaim against the Crumps. Thus, the Crumps correctly state that they
successfully avoided all liability on Bromley's counterclaim and Bromley incorrectly claims he
"recovered" on his counterclaim.

II.
THE MAGISTRATE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING BROMLEY WAS
THE PREVAILING PARTY IN THIS ACTION.
The Crumps recognize that the court has broad discretion in identifying the prevailing
party, but "the court's discretion is not unbridled." Jerry J Joseph CL. U Ins. Associates, Inc. v.
Vaught, 117 Idaho 555, 557 (Ct.App. 1990). Here, the magistrate court abused its discretion by

misinterpreting and misapplying Eighteen Mile Ranch v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141
Idaho 716 (2005) to conclude that Bromley was the prevailing party. In fact, as explained in the

1
2

Seep. 5 of Respondent's Brief.
Seep. 5 of Respondent's Brief.
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Crumps' initial brief, the magistrate court's decision in this case demonstrates a greater abuse of
discretion than the district court's decision in Eighteen Mile Ranch that this Court reversed.
Again, if the magistrate court had ruled that neither party was a prevailing party, the facts of this
case would be the same as in Eighteen Mile Ranch and warrant reversal. However, because the
magistrate court found Bromley was the prevailing party even though he recovered no judgment
on his claim and had judgment entered against him, the magistrate court's decision demonstrates
an even greater abuse of discretion than the district court's decision in Eighteen Mile Ranch that
this Court reversed.
Bromley fails to provide any substantive discussion of Eighteen Mile Ranch or any
argument to distinguish this case from that one. Instead, Bromley merely recites the abuse of
discretion standard and-without offering any analysis-makes the conclusory statements that
the magistrate recognized the issue as one of discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of its
discretion, and reached its decision in an exercise of reason. 3 Specifically, Bromley does not
explain how the court's exercise of discretion falls within the outer boundaries established by
Eighteen Mile Ranch.
Moreover, Bromley provides no justifying excuse for the magistrate court's abuse of
discretion in erroneously interpreting and applying Rule 68 in its prevailing party analysis. First,
nothing in Rule 68 relates to the determination of the prevailing party. Second, the magistrate
erred by comparing Bromley's offer of judgment to the judgment and not the adjusted award as
required by Rule 68. Rule 68 requires, i.e., mandates, that the court add all costs and attorney's
fees (incurred as of the date of the service of the formal offer of judgment) to the award before
making the comparison. Bromley offers no rebuttal to either of these errors.

3

See pp. 3-5 of Respondent's Brief.
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III.
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE MAGISTRATE COURT'S
FINDING THAT BROMLEY WAS THE PREY AILING PARTY IN THIS ACTION.
The district court erred by applying Rule 68 to determine the prevailing party. The
purpose of Rule 68 is to allow an "offeror," who is ultimately held liable (and, importantly, who
may not be found the prevailing party), to nonetheless avoid liability for that portion of the
prevailing party "offeree's" costs and attorney's fees incurred after the date of service of the
successful offer of judgment. In fact, a plaintiff-offeree may be the "prevailing party" in the
action, but not the "prevailing party" under Rule 68. In short, the "prevailing party" analysis is
unrelated to Rule 68.
Bromley offers no facts or law to justify the district court's errors in this regard.
Bromley's contention that "an offer of judgment is one factor which the court may consider in
reaching a prevailing party determination" 4 is unsupported by the single case he relies on. In
Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 313 (2000), the issue on appeal was whether the offer of

judgment should be compared to the jury's verdict or the final judgment. The Court determined
that the-judgment to be considered in an offer of judgment analysis is the final judgment, not the
jury's verdict. Id The Polk court did state or imply that a Rule 68 offer of judgment is a factor
that the court may consider in determining the prevailing party. As such, Bromley's reliance on
Polk is entirely misplaced.

Further, Bromley offers no justification for the district court's misapplication of Payne v.
Wallace, 136 Idaho 303 (Ct.App. 2001). Instead, Bromley simply recites the district court's

erroneous statement that a Rule 68 analysis may include only attorney's fees "actually

4

Seep. 6 of Respondent's Brief.
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awarded." 5 Both Bromley and the district court fail to recognize the plain language of Rule 68
that the court consider attorney fees that are "awardable," not fees actually "awarded." In Payne,
attorney's fees were not awardable to the plaintiff, so the court properly refused to consider them
in its Rule 68 analysis. To the contrary, in this case attorney's fees are in fact "awardable," so
the district court erred by refusing to consider the Crumps' attorney's fees in its Rule 68 analysis.
Additionally, Bromley does not refute the Crumps' contention that the district court's
analysis imposes two competing "first" conditions precedent that result in a circular conundrum.
To determine whether to award the Crumps' attorney' fees, the district court decided it must
"first" determine whether the Crumps are the prevailing party. However, to determine whether
the Crumps are the prevailing party, the district court decided to apply Rule 68 under which the
district court must "first" determine whether the Crumps are entitled to an award of attorney's
fees. Bromley does not and cannot make sense of the district court's circular error in this regard.
Finally, Bromley offers no justifiable reason for the district court's failure to consider the
"final judgment or result of the action" as expressly required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure
54(d)(l)(B). The Jaw does not permit the court to consider the reasons, motives, fears, hopes, or
dreams of the parties that led a judgment. Rather, the law requires the district court to consider
"the resultant judgment or judgments obtained." Eighteen Mile Ranch, supra, 141 Idaho at 719
(emphasis added). To avoid the arbitrariness and uncertainty of a court wandering into an
inquiry of "why" a particular result obtained, Rule 54(d)(l )(B) directs courts to compare the
"final judgment or result of the action" with the relief sought by the parties. The district court
seems to have improperly looked beyond the "final judgment or result of the action" and
impermissibly considered the underlying reasons for the judgment rather than the judgment
itself. Again, parties must be allowed to rely on the plain language of our rules and laws in order
5
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to guide their considerations of whether to pursue settlement or continue litigating. By looking
beyond the plain language of Rule 54(d)(l )(B), the district court erred by "changing the rules
halfway through the game." Bromley offers no reason why the district court's decision should
stand.
IV.
BROMLEY WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO SEEK ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON
APPEAL.
Idaho Appellate Rule 4l(a) provides, "Any party seeking attorney fees on appeal must
assert such a claim as an issue presented on appeal in the first appelJate brief filed by such party
as provided by Rules 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5)." (Emphasis added.) Moreover, Idaho Appellate
Rule 35(b)(5) provides, "If the respondent is claiming attorney fees on appeal the respondent
must so indicate in the division of additional issues on appeal that respondent is claiming
attorney fees and state the basis for the claim." (Emphasis added.)
This Court has been particularly strict in requiring parties' adherence to these rules. For
example, in Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 750-751 (2000), the Court
explained as follows: ·
The Idaho Appellate Rules require that an appellant's brief be filed and
that it state the issues presented upon appeal, the contentions of the appellant
with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reason therefor, with citations
to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon. See
I.AR. 34, 35. Absent compliance with these rules, the Court will not search the
recordfor error. See Woods v. Crouse, IO! Idaho 764,765,620 P.2d 798, 799
(1980).
In its brief, Idaho Power states that its cross-appeal for denial of attorney
fees will be addressed in a brief in support of cross-appeal. This Court has not
received such a brief and Idaho Power's assignment of error has not been
supported by argument within the time period required by the appellate rules. We
therefore hold that Idaho Power has waived this issue on appeal.
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Further, in Weaver v. Searle Bros., 129 Idaho 497, 503 (1996), this Court noted that
although the party had identified attorney's fees on appeal in its statement of issues, the party
failed to address the issue in the argument section of its brief as required by the appellate rules.
As such, the Court denied the party's request for attorney's fees.
Here, Bromley failed to assert his claim for attorney's fees and costs in the statement of
issues on appeal. 6 Primarily, this Court should deny Bromley's request for attorney's fees and
costs on appeal because this Court should reverse the lower courts. Nonetheless, this Court
should deny Bromley's request for attorney's fees and costs on appeal because he failed to assert
his claim in his statement of issues on appeal as expressly required by I.A.R. 35 and 41.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the magistrate court's finding that
Bromley is the prevailing party and the district court's decision affirming the magistrate court's
finding. The Court should award the Crumps their attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal.
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this

_d_ day of April, 2009.
SMITH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC

By: ~ - = = = r - - -

Jr2Driscol1
Attorneys for Appellants,

Doug Crump and Amy Crump
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

J.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this
day of April, 2009, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF to be served, by placing the
same in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, or hand
delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following:

[V] U.S. Mail
[
[
[
[

]
]
]
]

Facsimile Transmission
Overnight Delivery
Hand Delivery
Courthouse Mail Box
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Justin B. Oleson, Esq.
BLASER, SORENSEN & OLESON, CHTD
P. 0. Box 1047
Blackfoot, Idaho 83221

